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Abstract
Current post-epidemic sero-surveillance uses random selection of animal holdings. A better strategy may be to estimate the
benefits gained by sampling each farm and use this to target selection. In this study we estimate the probability of
undiscovered infection for sheep farms in Devon after the 2001 foot-and-mouth disease outbreak using the combination of
a previously published model of daily infection risk and a simple model of probability of discovery of infection during the
outbreak. This allows comparison of the system sensitivity (ability to detect infection in the area) of arbitrary, random
sampling compared to risk-targeted selection across a full range of sampling budgets. We show that it is possible to achieve
95% system sensitivity by sampling, on average, 945 farms with random sampling and 184 farms with risk-targeted
sampling. We also examine the effect of ordering samples by risk to expedite return to a disease-free status. Risk ordering
the sampling process results in detection of positive farms, if present, 15.6 days sooner than with randomly ordered
sampling, assuming 50 farms are tested per day.
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Introduction
After the apparent end of an animal disease epidemic, a country
will normally benefit from demonstrating that infection is no
longer present in its livestock. This is both to satisfy international
trade requirements [1,2] and also to identify previously undiscov-
ered infection to prevent recrudescence. Demonstration that
infection has been controlled also has domestic, societal and
political advantages. The process is described as demonstration of
disease freedom [3] .With many diseases this process includes a
prescribed sampling of livestock in the vicinity of the previously
affected premises. Appropriate diagnostic tests are used to
determine the serological status of sampled animals and hence
infer the infection status of the whole region. Unless all animals are
simultaneously sampled with a perfect diagnostic test there will be
uncertainty in the subsequent estimate of a region’s infection
status. Much work has been done to determine optimal sample
sizes and performance limits of such surveys [3,4,5,6,7,8]. These
studies assume random sampling of animal holdings, usually
within a defined surveillance zone that would normally surround
the previously infected premises. Current disease control and
surveillance policies generally involve the definition of a
surveillance zone as a buffer at a prescribed radius around
previously detected, infected premises. In the case of foot-and-
mouth disease in the United Kingdom this is a 10 Km radius zone
around any designated infected premises. For the purposes of
illustration and discussion this study will focus on the design of
post-foot-and-mouth disease epidemic surveys although the
approach may be generalised to other diseases.
Post-epidemic demonstration of freedom from foot-and-mouth
disease is informed by guidelines from The World Organisation
for Animal Health (OIE). Previously these guidelines have been
prescriptive regarding the sampling strategy. Changes in OIE
guidelines have increased flexibility allowing a more pragmatic
approach to design, provided that the survey adequately supports
the claim of disease freedom [1].
The original guidelines required farms to be selected from
within the surveillance zone on a random basis to achieve an
expected survey system performance (e.g. a 95% confidence of
detecting an infected farm if infection is present at a predeter-
mined design prevalence such as 2%). Within each selected farm,
samples are taken to achieve a within-farm expected survey
performance; typically to detect infection on the farm with a 95%
probability if it were present at some previously defined, within-
group, design prevalence (often 5%). In the case of disease control
by vaccination, current procedures may advise testing of all
vaccinated animals on all vaccinated farms [9,10]. Diagnostic tests
have imperfect specificity, including those optimised for vaccinated
animals, and farms may occasionally be classified as previously
infected when they are not. These false positive farms will
normally be screened by further confirmatory diagnostic testing.
Our study examines the traditional approach for post epidemic
surveillance for disease freedom using random selection of farms
within the surveillance zone and suggests a more efficient
methodology. This targets farm selection using a model of un-
discovered infection risk to choose which farms to sample and
when to sample them. This approach is expected to reduce
sampling costs by requiring fewer farms to be tested and to
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expedite a region’s return to disease-free status by finding infected
farms, if they are present, more quickly. Risk based approaches
have been previously discussed for identification of disease
freedom from Trichinella in pigs [11] and Scrapie in sheep [12].
These studies showed significant benefits to risk-targeted sample
selection. Our study considers the application of risk-targeted
surveillance to a post-epidemic population.
Methods
In this study we discuss the estimation of surveillance system
performance from an estimated risk of undiscovered infection on
each animal holding. Then we compare the performance of risk-
targeted and random surveillance systems in a post-epidemic
setting using available data.
Surveillance system sensitivity
The purpose of post-epidemic sero-surveillance is to inform a
decision about the disease status of a region. A requirement of
classification of a region as free-of-disease is surveillance evidence
of no previously infected animals or circulating infection. In this
analysis we consider that the performance of a survey to
demonstrate disease freedom is assessed by the probability that it
detects infection or circulation of infection in a region if infection is
present. This is the system sensitivity (SSe) [13]. For this analysis
we assume that an optimally efficient survey design either:
1. Maximises, for a given budget, the probability (SSe) of
detecting any infected but previously undetected (hereafter
referred to as ‘undiscovered infected’) animals in the area, if
present, or;
2. Minimises the sampling cost of a survey that achieves a desired
probability (SSe) of detecting undiscovered infected animals, if
present, in the area.
The system sensitivity SSe is defined:
SSe~P(TzjDz) ð1Þ
Where Tz is the event of at least one farm testing positive in the
region, Dz is the event of at least one farm being infected but not
detected prior to the start of post-epidemic serological surveillance
and P Eð Þ is probability of an event E.
SSe can be estimated by assuming that the test system has
perfect system specificity as discussed in [14]. That is, any initially
test-positive farms are retested until they are demonstrated to be
genuine positive or cannot be shown to be negative. Effectively the
case definition for a test positive farm is a farm that tests positive
after confirmatory and follow-up retesting, irrespective of its true
infection status.
So generally with a diagnostic system:
P Tzð Þ~P TzjDzð Þ|P Dzð ÞzP TzjD{ð Þ|P D{ð Þ
Assuming perfect system specificity:
P TzjD{ð Þ~0
So:
P Tzð Þ~P TzjDzð Þ|P Dzð Þ
hence
P TzjDzð Þ~SSe~P T
zð Þ
P Dzð Þ ð2Þ
To estimate the system sensitivity (SSe) of different post epidemic
sampling strategies using equation (2) it is necessary to estimate
P Tzð Þ:
P Tzð Þ~1{ P
i[s1::n
(1{Pi|ri)
Where Pi is the probability that farm i is infected and
undiscovered, s1...n are the indices of a sampled set of n farms
from the population of N farms and ri is the farm level sensitivity
on farm i (i.e. the probability of a positive farm result if an infected
farm is selected, sampled and tested). We assume that Pi and ri
are independent, i.e. the sensitivity with which infection is detected
on a farm is independent of the risk that the farm is infected and
undiscovered.
P Dzð Þ, the probability that undiscovered infected animals
remain in the region is estimated:
P Dzð Þ~1{ P
i[1::N
(1{Pi)
Giving:
SSe~
1{ P
i[s1::n
(1{Pi|ri)
1{ P
i[1::N
(1{Pi)
ð3Þ
Risk-targeted versus random farm selection
If all farms have an equal probability of being infected and
undiscovered, the survey has a constant farm level sensitivity
across all farms and the cost of sampling farms is constant there
will be no advantage of risk-targeted sampling over random
sampling. However if the probability of infection, Pi, or farm
sensitivity ri vary then maximum system sensitivity within a
sampling or cost constraint will be obtained by selecting a sample
set s1...n of n farms to maximize:
P Tzð Þ~1{ P
si~1::n
(1{ri|Pi)
As ri|Pi is always positive this is maximised by maximizing
ri|Pi. If the sampling constraint is simply a number of farms, n,
to be sampled this gives a sample set of the first n farms when they
are ordered by decreasing ri|Pi.
If the sampling constraint is a fixed sampling cost budget and it
is assumed that all farms have an equal sampling cost (cost of
visiting the farm plus cost of sampling on the farm) then the most
efficient sample will be the selection of as many farms as possible
choosing farms in order of decreasing ri|Pi until the budget
constraint is met.
The efficiency gains from risk-targeted sampling will depend on
the form of the distribution of undiscovered infection risk. In the
following section we adapt a previously published model for risk of
infection and use it to estimate potential gains in surveillance
system efficiency resulting from application of risk-based as
opposed to random sampling in a post-epidemic surveillance
scenario.
Risk-Targeted Post-Epidemic Surveillance
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Study scenario - Devon, UK 2001 foot-and-mouth disease
epidemic
We estimated the performance gains of risk-targeted surveil-
lance using historical data from the foot-and-mouth outbreak in
Devon, UK in 2001. The post-epidemic surveillance analysis is
confined to sheep only as this was the species subject to widespread
sero-surveillance. To estimate the gains of risk-targeted surveil-
lance we need an estimate of risk of undiscovered infection for the
candidate farms. In this example the risk of infection is estimated
using a statistical model [15].. Our analysis also requires an
estimate of probability that infection escapes discovery during the
outbreak period. In this example this was estimated from post-
outbreak surveillance data. In future application of risk-targeted
surveillance the discovery model results would have to be assumed
to be exchangeable across similar outbreaks or estimated from
local or small-scale surveillance data.
Epidemic model
The foot-and-mouth disease outbreak in Devon 2001 was
estimated to start on the 17th February and end with animals on
the last known infected premises culled on 19th June 2001. One
hundred and seventy two premises were declared as ‘infected
premises’ based on clinical signs and subsequent confirmation
during the outbreak. Disease was controlled with movement
restrictions and by culling and disinfection of the infected premises
and other designated high-risk holdings. Sero-surveillance during
and after the epidemic identified a further 15 farms in this area as
infected but otherwise undiscovered (these farms were recorded in
the DEFRA submission to the OIE to substantiate freedom from
disease and hence recorded in the disease control system database
[16,17]).
Diggle et al. [18] use a partial likelihood approach to
parameterise a model of daily infection probability for each farm
in Devon based on the modelling framework from Keeling et al.
[19]. This model will hereafter be referred to as the ‘transmission
model’. From the transmission model, the probability, Ii,t, that an
uninfected farm i becomes infected on day t of the epidemic is
estimated using formula 4.
Ii,t ~ 1{exp {
X
j[infected farms at time t
l(t)g(dij)AjBi
 !
ð4Þ
Where:
Aj~1:42N
0:13
cattlezN
0:13
sheep
Bi~36:2N
0:13
cattlezN
0:13
sheep
Aj represents the transmission potential of an infected farm j, Bi
the susceptibility of farm i. Ncattle and Nsheep are the stocking
numbers of cattle and sheep respectively. The parameter l tð Þ
is a baseline hazard. The distance kernel g dð Þ, representing the
decreasing risk of transmission between farms with increasing
Euclidean separation, d i,jð Þ is modelled:
g(d)~exp {
d
0:41
 0:5( )
z1:3|10{4 ð5Þ
Transmission model parameters were as used in [18] except the
baseline hazard (l tð Þ), which represented the overall risk of
transmission occurring in the Devon area, varying with time,
during the epidemic. In Diggle (2006) [18] this was estimated from
the daily case report data (approximately 561025 with slight
variation over the course of the epidemic). This baseline hazard
would be dependent on stocking densities, husbandry practices,
foot-and-mouth disease virus serotype, time of year and other
factors. For the Devon region the baseline hazard was relatively
constant with time so was kept fixed in our model for simulation
purposes.
We used this modified transmission model to estimate the day-
by-day probability of infection in each of the 4856 premises in
Devon recorded as having sheep in the June 2000 agricultural
censuses conducted in England and Wales by the Ministry of
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (Department for Environment
Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) from June 2001. The simulation
used the estimated infection and culling dates from the 172
premises designated as ‘infected premises’ during the outbreak in
2001 from the disease control system (DCS) database [17] as
potential sources of infection.
There are two scenarios by which an infected farm will become
a farm with undiscovered infection by failure to observe clinical
disease: one is if infection on the farm is not clinically detectable
i.e. disease is effectively sub-clinical; the other is if clinical signs
are present but are not observed. The latter scenario is partially
time dependent, there being a limited period during which
infection may be clinically detected (of up to several weeks
duration). As serological surveillance will normally start several
weeks after the last clinically observed case and the frequency of
cases in the tail end of the epidemic is low the time dependent
effects may be disregarded and the two modes by which a farm
may be missed considered as one probability. It is necessary to
estimate a non-discovery multiplier to estimate the probability
that an infected farm is not detected and becomes an
undiscovered infected farm. This probability may be different
for every farm and is likely to change over the course of the
epidemic and post-epidemic period as surveillance efforts vary.
Unfortunately only limited data are available to estimate this
parameter for each farm.
Estimation of probability of discovery of infection
The post epidemic sero-surveillance in Devon after the 2001
epidemic involved sampling and testing of some 4,407 farms from
approximately 4,500 remaining sheep farms [16] using a well
validated solid phase ELISA test with confirmatory virus
neutralisation testing [20]. We assume that all farms that could
be serologically discovered were discovered. Sero-surveillance
identified ten holdings as sero-positive in Devon after the
slaughter date of the last infected premises (we have not
considered the five serologically detected premises prior to this
date as representative of infections not discovered during the
epidemic). One hundred and seventy two holdings were identified
as infected premises during the epidemic in Devon having been
detected either clinically or by in-epidemic sero-surveillance.
Exploratory data analysis suggests that farms that were
discovered during the epidemic were more likely to have cattle
present and more likely to be close to other infected premises. We
used a logistic regression approach, modelling the log odds of a
farm being serologically discovered as a linear function (equation
5) of risk factors to estimate the discovery probability across farms
and also to capture the large uncertainty in the associated
parameter estimates resulting from estimation based on only 10
positive cases . The probability of discovery d of an infected farm
was modelled:
Risk-Targeted Post-Epidemic Surveillance
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d~
ez
1zez
z~b0zbcattleXcattlezbnearXnear ð5Þ
Where eb0 is the baseline odds of discovery, ebcattle the odds ratio
for discovery if cattle are present and ebnear the odds ratio for
discovery if the farm is within 3 Km of an IP. Xcattle and Xnear are
indicator variables for presence of cattle and adjacency to an IP.
This model is hereafter referred to as the ‘discovery model’.
Given the limited number of serologically discovered farms in
the data set, binary predictor variables of cattle presence (i.e. cattle
numbers greater than zero) and adjacency of less than 3 Km
to the nearest infected premises (IP) were used to reduce the model
complexity. The 3 Km adjacency cut-off was selected as
regulations require there to be a heightened surveillance during
an epidemic in the zone within 3 Km of infected premises and
hence there is likely to be a higher probability that an infected
farm is discovered. The probability of detection is assumed to
remain fixed for each farm over the course of the epidemic.
The parameters of the discovery model were estimated from the
sero-surveillance results for Devon in 2001 using a Bayesian
approach with vague priors for the risk factor coefficients. The
Bayesian posterior estimates were generated with Monte Carlo
Markov chain simulation in JAGS software [21] called from the R
Statistical system [22] retaining 5000 sets of samples from the
posterior distribution of the parameters after discarding an initial
set of 5000 simulations. Alternative parameterisation and the
inclusion of different predictors were compared using the
Deviance Information Criterion [23]. Chain convergence was
assessed using the Brooks, Gelman and Rubin statistic [24].
Draws from these posterior distributions were then used with
demographic data from the 2001 Agricultural census (as a
sampling frame and source of stock/location data) to estimate
the mean probability of discovery, if infected, for each sheep farm
in Devon. Daily probability of infection from the transmission
model and probability of discovery if infected from the discovery
model are combined to estimate the daily probability for each
sheep farm that the farm has become infected and that the
infection has not been detected. This assumes that the probability
of discovery and probability of infection are independent,
conditional on the risk factors used in the transmission and
discovery models. i.e.
Pi,t~Ii,t|di
The resulting daily probability of farm i becoming infected yet not
clinically detected is converted to a probability that farm i has
become infected yet not clinically detected at any point during the
epidemic, Pi:
Pi~1{ P
t[T
1{Pi,tð Þ ð6Þ
Where Pi,t if the probability of undiscovered infection on farm i on
day t, estimated with the transmission and discovery models and T
is the duration of the epidemic.
System sensitivity versus number of farms sampled
The system sensitivity (SSe) of risk targeted surveys is estimated
using a range of farm sample sizes (n) from just one farm to the
whole population, by preferentially selecting the n farms with the
highest probability of undiscovered infection using equation 6. For
this estimation the farm-level diagnostic sensitivity (ri) was set at
95%. For comparison the expected system sensitivity for randomly
selected samples is estimated by simulation. The random sampling
is assumed to take place from within the 3 Km protection and
10 Km surveillance zones. For each sample (size n) of farms from 1
to the remaining, post-epidemic, population of 3526 sheep farms,
within the protection and surveillance zones, 1000 random
samples of size n were drawn (without replacement). The system
sensitivity of each sample was calculated using equation 3 and the
mean for each sample size stored.
Zonal location of sampled farms
Conventionally farms are sampled from within the surveillance
and protection zones. This may not be the most efficient
approach; it is possible that farms outside these zones may be at
higher risk of undiscovered infection and hence should be sampled
with priority. To investigate this farms were classified by
decreasing probability of undiscovered infection according to their
location within their zones. The zones used are the current 3 Km
protection and 10 Km surveillance zones constructed using the
respective buffers around the 172 infected premises from the
Devon 2001 epidemic.
Consequences of imperfect information
The above methodology makes the assumption that the overall
model used to estimate each farm’s probability of undiscovered
infection is correct i.e. the transmission model is precise and
unbiased and that the discovery model’s estimate of probability of
discovery is exchangeable between epidemic settings. It does not
assume perfect information about each farm’s undiscovered
infection status but perfect information about each farm’s
probability of undiscovered infection. In reality, any model
estimating the probability of infection in a farm will have error.
With risk-targeted sampling, it is the rank of estimated
probabilities of undiscovered infection and their heterogeneity
that determines the choice and expected benefits of farm selection.
A model that estimates the probabilities as a monotonic increasing
function of the true probabilities will still be able to perfectly
inform selection of an optimal sampling set (though give an
incorrect estimate of its system sensitivity) for a given sample size.
Sub-optimal farm selection will only occur when the model causes
incorrect selection of lower probability farms for inclusion in the
sample. Imperfect models that correctly rank the farms’ risk of
undiscovered infection will, however, incorrectly estimate the
system sensitivity achieved by a survey.
To investigate the effect of model uncertainty we explored two
approaches to adding an error component to the overall estimate
of probability of undiscovered infection derived from the
transmission and discovery models. One approach modifies the
estimated probability of infection for each farm by adding
normally distributed error on the log-odds scale. The other
randomises a proportion of the estimated probabilities so that only
a proportion of the farms’ have an accurately estimated risk of
infection. The estimates with added error are then used to select
farms and with the original, added error-free risk estimates, used to
estimate system sensitivity performance of the resulting simulated
datasets. These approaches are described in detail below.
Transformed normal error approach
The transmission model and discovery model are used to
estimate the probability of undiscovered infection Pi for each farm
i. This value is then transformed to the log-odds scale and a
Risk-Targeted Post-Epidemic Surveillance
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normally distributed error component is added. The result is then
re-transformed to the probability scale:
P
0
i~invLogit logit(Pi)zN(0,s)ð Þ ð7Þ
Where P
0
i is the transformed probability of undiscovered infection
on farm i and logit and invLogit are the logistic and inverse logistic
transformations respectively. For s greater than zero this will add
an error component to the model’s predictions. For a range of s
from 0 to 25 the estimated probabilities with error added as in
equation 7 were used to select farms for sampling and the
probabilities from the original model (with no error component
added) were used to estimate the resulting system sensitivity
(performance). This estimation was repeated 1000 times to provide
an estimate of the mean performance with each level of overall
prediction error.
An alternative partial knowledge approach
Rather than simulating errors in the estimation of each farm’s
risk, we also estimate the performance of risk-targeted sampling if
the risk is only correctly known for a proportion of farms. This was
done for proportions from 1 (i.e. perfect knowledge) to 0 (i.e. no
information on risk of undiscovered infection).
Effect of risk-targeted sampling on delay to declaration
of disease freedom
Given a selected set of farms for sero-surveillance sampling
(whether by the above transmission and discovery model-driven
method or by another, e.g. random sampling or a veterinary
expert directed method) there may be flexibility to choose the
order with which farms are visited and sampled. Sampling and
subsequent sample handling, analysis and recording may intro-
duce delays of several days between sampling and result. If a
sampled farm tests positive for infection and virus is subsequently
isolated on a farm it may be classified as a new outbreak and
consequently disease freedom may not be declared until a fixed
period has elapsed after the culling of stock on this farm. Hence it
is desirable to order sampling such that farms that are most likely
to have undiscovered infection will be visited, sampled and
analysed first.
To estimate the potential benefits of ordered sampling we
estimate time from start of sampling to identification (on average)
of the last positive farm for sero-surveillance in Devon. A sample
set of farms of a given size is selected, either at random from the
whole population, or by decreasing risk of undiscovered infection
using the transmission and discovery models. Sampling from these
farms is then simulated over a surveillance period assuming that 50
farms can be sampled each day. In the risk-targeted approach
high-risk farms are sampled first. In the random approach the
farms are sampled in a random order. Over repeated simulations
the status of sampled farms is simulated (using a bernoulli process
with probability equal to the farm’s probability of undiscovered
infection). For all farms this status is combined with their simulated
sample timing data to give the time that each positive farm was
sampled. Repeated over the simulation set the maximum of this
time delay gives an estimate of the time from start of sampling to
the sampling of the last positive farm for each approach.
d~max ti|bern(Pi)f gi[farms to sample ð8Þ
Where d is the date of sampling of last positive farm, ti the
sampling date for farm i and bern(Pi) a Bernoulli random variable
with probability Pi. We assume that 50 farms are sampled and
tested each day. The simulation was repeated 5000 times for a
range of sample sizes and the mean of the latest dates stored.
The transmission and discovery models, subsequent estimations
of risk and evaluations of system sensitivity were calculated with
the R Statistical System [22].
Results
Results from discovery model
Farms with cattle present were more likely to be detected, if
infected, during the epidemic, as were farms within 3 Km of a
previously infected farm. The magnitude of these estimates has a
large uncertainty. Detailed results are shown in Table 1.
Overall estimated of risk of undiscovered infection
The estimates of post-epidemic undiscovered infection combine
the transmission model with a farm-specific estimate of discovery
of infection from the discovery model. The model estimated an
expected 11.2 infected but not discovered farms in Devon with 7.8
within the protection zone (0–3 Km from the nearest IP), 3.0
within the surveillance zone (3–10 Km from the nearest IP) zones
and an expected 0.4 farms outside these zones. The results are
summarised, by zone, in Table 2. The spatial distribution of risk of
undiscovered infection is shown in Figure 1. Farms with a high risk
of undiscovered infection are spatially associated with the premises
that were identified as infected during the epidemic. The spatial
component of risk of undiscovered infection is a combination of
the increased risk of farms near to detected infected premises and
the increased probability of undiscovered farms being further from
detected infected premises. The results suggest that the modelled
infection risk overwhelms the estimated discovery risk such that,
overall, farms near to detected infected farms are more likely to be
infected but undiscovered.
Performance of risk-targeted sampling
The comparative results of risk-targeted sampling and random
sampling are shown in Figure 2. Risk-targeted sampling gives a
markedly better performance than random sampling for the same
sample size (number of farms visited); for example, assuming the
combination of transmission and discovery models provides
perfect information about a farm’s probability of undiscovered
infection, only 184 farms need to be sampled to give a 95% system
sensitivity as compared to 945 farms if random sampling is used.
These system sensitivity performance gains relative to sample size
would either increase the probability that the survey system detects
disease, if present, or reduce the cost of surveillance to attain a
required (95%) system performance. The relative gains of
employing risk-targeted sampling decrease as the sample size
Table 1. Results from Bayesian discovery model - mean and
SD of coefficients of logistic model (and odds ratio) predicting
discovery of an infected farm.
Variable Mean SD Odds
Cattle present1 3.11 0.97 22.5
Near IP (#3 Km)2 2.67 0.87 14.4
1Are any cattle recorded as present on the holding according to the agricultural
census?
2Is the holding in question within 3 Km of a previously determined infected
premises?
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020064.t001
Risk-Targeted Post-Epidemic Surveillance
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increases until approximately 2000 farms are sampled when both
risk-targeted and random sampling converge onto a system
sensitivity of 1. The improvement in performance using risk-
targeted sampling was found to be robust to error in the risk
estimate; risk-targeted sampling was still more efficient than
random sampling from the protection and surveillance zones when
the risk status was known for only 20% of the farms.
Zonal sampling
Conventionally, sampling has drawn samples, unless veterinary
judgement suggests otherwise, from within the 10 Km surveillance
zone. Figure 3 shows the zone that samples would be taken from
when risk-targeted sampling is used with the potential to draw
from any farm in the restricted area. As sample size increases to
1476 farms the first farm outside the protection and surveillance
zones will be selected. By a sample size of 2254 only 1% of farms
will be selected from the area outside the surveillance zone. These
sample sizes represent system sensitivities of virtually 100% and as
such would be unlikely to be required for regulatory purposes.
These results suggest that the conventional approach of sampling
within the surveillance zone is rational if random selection within a
geographical buffer zone is a regulatory requirement.
Figure 1. Risk-map for undiscovered infection. Estimated risk that individual sheep/mixed farms may be infected but undiscovered with foot-
and-mouth disease at the end of the UK 2001 outbreak in the county of Devon. Farms classified as infected premises (IP) in 2001 are shown as black
circles. The ten farms found to be sero-positive in 2001 after the epidemic are also shown (blue dots).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020064.g001
Table 2. The mean result of 500 simulations for the 3 km protection zone, the 10 km surveillance zone and the whole region.
Zone Total farms1 Cumulative farms Expected undiscovered farms2 SSe (all farms in zone)3
Protection zone (0–3 Km) 1439 1439 7.79 0.976
Surveillance zone (3–10 Km) 2087 3526 3.01 0.821
Other (.10 Km) 1330 4856 0.381 0.337
Results are given for each zone and cumulatively across zones. They are the number of farms, the expected number of undiscovered infected farms and the system
sensitivity if all farms in the zone were sampled with an on-farm survey of 100% sensitivity.
1The total number of animal holdings within the zone.
2The expected number of farms in the zone that will have an undiscovered infection.
3The estimated system sensitivity to detect previous infection in the entire region if all the farms in the particular zone are sampled and tested.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020064.t002
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Effect of ordering on delays to disease freedom
The time to last positive sample is plotted against the system
sensitivity for a risk-ordered and randomly ordered approach to
farm sampling in Figure 4. The result demonstrates that risk-
targeted sampling and ordering, given a desired system sensitivity,
will result in any farms that turn out to be test positive being
selected and sampled markedly sooner than if ordering is not used.
For a target system sensitivity of 95%, risk-targeted selection and
ordering (assuming 50 farms can be sampled and tested per day)
will, on average, mean that the last positive farm is sampled 2.8
days after sampling commences whereas random selection will
mean that the last positive farm is sampled 18.4 days after
sampling starts. Detection of a test positive farm will result in
follow up confirmatory tests and possible disease control
consequences such as further investigation of contact farms and
animal culling. Hence risk-targeted ordering may decrease delays
to ultimate declaration of disease freedom in a region that has
experienced a disease outbreak. Furthermore previously undis-
covered infected farms may be viable sources of onwards
transmission so prioritising detection of such farms with applica-
tion of appropriate disease control may reduce the probability of
disease reappearance compared to random ordering.
Discussion
This study shows that a suitable model of infection risk can be
used to target and order sero-surveillance sampling to increase
efficiency and reduce delays to declaring disease freedom after a
foot-and-mouth disease outbreak. Historically, post-epidemic
surveillance for foot-and-mouth disease has targeted sampling to
farms within the 3 Km protection zone and 10 Km surveillance
zone, presumably on the basis that any undetected infected farms
are most likely to be in these areas. This involves an implicit spatial
assumption about disease transmission that may be derived from
veterinary assessment. Risk-targeted selection refines this to target
specific farms within the vicinity of the outbreak/epidemic. The
benefits of this technique are shown to be potentially large with an
80% reduction in sample sizes for the same system performance
(95% SSe) and an expected 85% reduction in time to last positive
case.
Model uncertainty
The realization of these potential benefits is dependent on the
accuracy with which a predictive risk model can order farms by
undiscovered infection risk. We have used simple approaches to
model uncertainty to explore the consequences of imperfect
knowledge of farm infection risk. This shows that the benefits of
targeted sampling were reasonably robust to the introduction of
noise/uncertainty into model estimates; risk-targeted sampling
with knowledge of only 20% of farms’ infection risk will still result
in a better performance than surveillance-zone targeted sampling.
As long as a risk model has some information value it will increase
efficiency and reduce delays to declaring disease freedom.
However, if a predictive model of farm infection risk is
particularly poor (i.e. almost random in its predictions) its
application could result in a survey with efficiency and timing
worse than a randomly sampled and ordered survey that draws
from the traditional (overall high risk) surveillance and protection
zones. Whilst such a scenario is unlikely it means that the risk-
targeted sampling and ordering approach should be used
cautiously, especially with models that are potentially over-fitted,
unstable or otherwise suspect.
Assumption of 95% farm sensitivity
For the comparisons of performance we have assumed that all
farms’ livestock are sampled and tested to give a farm level
diagnostic sensitivity of 95% in accordance with previous OIE
codes. Depending on the size of the farm and the available
diagnostic tests the cost of reaching this performance will vary
from farm to farm and may even be unobtainable when the
individual animal diagnostic test sensitivity is lower than the farm
level performance target and the farm size is small [25]. If this
constraint were removed then a survey design would have freedom
to choose not only which farms in the region to sample but rather
which animals in the region to sample and indeed which
diagnostic test to use and how to interpret the results for each
sample. Although the removal of these constraints would give a
potentially lower cost method of achieving a required regional
performance it is a high dimension optimisation problem that is
computationally difficult. Furthermore, the resulting varying farm-
by-farm performance and sampling requirements may be
politically harder to justify to both farmers and decision makers.
Discovery probability model
To estimate the probability that a farm is infected but has not
been detected we have used a model that estimated probability of
infection and detection and a simple model of discovery
probability. The discovery model used a distance greater than
3 Km to an infected farm and presence of cattle as farm risk
factors. The calculation of probability of undiscovered infection
using the simple product of this non-discovery probability and the
infection risk assumes that these two probabilities are independent,
conditional, on the risk factors included in both models. It is possible,
though, that other predictors such as location, farm size, farm
area, other stocking factors and husbandry factors will have a joint
influence on infection risk and discovery probability. These factors
may increase or decrease the variation in undiscovered infection
Figure 2. Performance of random and risk-targeted sampling.
Comparison of system sensitivity (SSe) of random sampling from the
protection (PZ) and surveillance zones (SZ), a 10 Km buffer around
designated infected premises (blue line) and risk-targeted sampling
(red line). Horizontal dashed line is at 95% system sensitivity (SSe), the
conventional target for region level post-epidemic surveillance. The
vertical lines dotted lines show corresponding sample sizes required to
achieve 95% SSe for the two approaches.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020064.g002
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risk and hence mean that the estimated benefits of risk-targeted
selection are incorrect. Whilst it is impossible to estimate this effect
without more data, it is unlikely given the large numerical range of
infection risk probabilities that the conditional effects would be
unlikely to significantly alter the order of estimated benefits and
hence the risk-targeted selection method is still likely to be
beneficial in comparison to random sampling.
We used a logistic regression framework for the discovery
model. In some scenarios such as an epidemic that is controlled
early with possibility of large numbers of undiscovered infection
other approaches may be valuable such as the inclusion of non-
discovery within the transmission modelling framework as
explored by Chis Ster et al. [26].
Probability of historical infection and risk of onwards
transmission
This analysis has used the classical approach to the declaration
of disease freedom where by all evidence of infection or circulation
of infection is treated equally. Recent sero-conversion is more
likely to be associated with infection that may result in onwards
transmission. Weighting for this has not been included in the
analysis but could be incorporated into risk targeted designs by
using a time increasing weighting factor on risk and hence
prioritising selection of potentially more recently infected farms.
Concluding remarks
Current, random sample based surveillance is likely to be
inefficient requiring more farms to be visited and more animals
to be sampled than necessary to achieve a given performance
target. Risk-targeted selection of farms for post epidemic
surveillance is more efficient and will also expedite the process
of declaration of disease freedom. Prompt detection of
undiscovered infected farms may also reduce the risk of onwards
transmission and recrudescence of the outbreak. The technique
of risk-targeted surveillance may be applied to different post
epidemic setting, such as after FMD controlled by vaccination
or for the elimination of other diseases such as Blue Tongue
Virus however such applications would require evaluation and
application with different models of transmission and discovery
probability. Whilst risk-targeted selection is robust, to give the
best and most reliable gains, risk models also need to be robust
and precise hence continued research will be required to model
the disease and surveillance processes to best inform such
surveillance strategies.
Figure 3. Risk-targeted sampling and traditional surveillance zones. Source zone of farms when the farms are allocated in decreasing
probability of undiscovered infection. Vertical dotted lines showing points at which first and first 1% of farms outside the surveillance zone (SZ – a 3–
10 Km buffer around designated infected premises) and the protection zone (PZ – a 3 Km buffer around designated infected premises) will be
selected. The red line shows the estimated system sensitivity (SSe) using risk-targeted selection for the range of sample sizes.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020064.g003
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